ShadowCallStack in Zircon & Fuchsia

Introduction

LLVM's shadow-call-stack feature is a compiler mode intended to harden the generated code against stack-smashing attacks such as exploits of buffer overrun bugs.

The Clang/LLVM documentation page linked above describes the scheme. The capsule summary is that the function return address is never reloaded from the normal stack but only from a separate "shadow call stack". This is an additional stack, but rather than containing whole stack frames of whatever size each function needs, it contains only a single address word for each call frame it records: just the return address. Since the shadow call stack is allocated independently of other stacks or heap blocks with its own randomized address to which pointers are rare, it is much less likely that some sort of buffer overrun or use-after-free exploit will overwrite a return address in memory so that it can cause the program to return to an instruction by the attacker.

The shadow-call-stack and safe-stack instrumentation schemes and ABIs are related and similar but also orthogonal. Each can be enabled or disabled independently for any function. Fuchsia's compiler ABI and libc always interoperate with code built with or without either kind of instrumentation, regardless of what instrumentation was or wasn't used in the particular libc build.

Interoperation and ABI Effects

In general, shadow-call-stack does not affect the ABI. The machine-specific calling conventions are unchanged. It works fine to have some functions in a program built with shadow-call-stack and some not. It doesn't matter if combining the two comes from directly compiled .o files, from archive libraries (.a files), or from shared libraries (.so files), in any combination.

While there is some additional per-thread state (the shadow call stack pointer, see below), code not using shadow-call-stack does not need to do anything about this state to keep it correct when calling, or being called by, code that does use safe-stack. The only potential exceptions to this are for code that is implementing its own kinds of non-local exits or context-switching (e.g. coroutines). The Zircon C library's setjmp/longjmp code saves and restores this additional state automatically, so anything that is based on longjmp already handles everything correctly even if the code calling setjmp and longjmp doesn't know about shadow-call-stack.

For AArch64 (ARM64), the x18 register is already reserved as "fixed" in the ABI generally. Code unaware of the shadow-call-stack extension to the ABI is interoperable with the shadow-call-stack ABI by default if it simply never touches x18.

The feature is not yet supported on any other architecture.

Use in Zircon & Fuchsia

This is enabled in the Clang compiler by the -fsanitize=shadow-call-stack command-line option. TODO(27339): When the support is fully tested and the ABI finalized for each machine, this will become the default mode of the compiler for *-fuchsia targets. To disable it for a specific compilation, use the -fno-sanitize=shadow-call-stack option.

Zircon supports shadow-call-stack both in the kernel and for user-mode code. For AArch64 (ARM64) shadow-call-stack is now on by default for all C and C++ user code in the Fuchsia build (including Zircon). TODO(27339): Code built outside the Fuchsia/Zircon GN build system still requires explicitly adding the -fsanitize=shadow-call-stack switch.

As with safe-stack, there is no separate facility for specifying the size of the shadow call stack. Instead, the size specified for "the stack" in legacy APIs (such as pthread_attr_setstacksize) and ABIs (such as PT_GNU_STACK) is used as the size for each kind of stack. Because the different kinds of stack are used in different proportions according to the particular program behavior, there is no good way to choose the shadow call stack size based on the traditional single stack size. So each kind of stack is as big as it might need to be in the worst case expected by the tuned "unitary" stack size. While this seems wasteful, it is only slightly so: at worst one page is wasted per kind of stack, plus the page table overhead of using more address space for pages that are never accessed.

Implementation details

The essential addition to support shadow-call-stack code is the shadow call stack pointer. This is a register with a global use, like the traditional stack pointer. But each call frame pushes and pops a single return address word rather than arbitrary data as in the normal stack frame.

For AArch64 (ARM64), the x18 register holds the shadow call stack pointer at function entry. The shadow call stack grows upwards with post-increment semantics, so x18 always points to the next free slot. The compiler never touches the register except to spill and reload the return address register (x30, aka LR). The Fuchsia ABI requires that x18 contain a valid shadow stack pointer at all times. That is, it must always be valid to push a new address onto the shadow call stack at x18 (modulo stack overflow).

Notes for low-level and assembly code

Most code, even in assembly, does not need to think about shadow-call-stack issues at all. The calling conventions are not changed. All use of the stack (and/or the unsafe stack) is the same with or without shadow-call-stack; when frame pointers are enabled, the return address will be stored on the machine stack next to the frame pointer as expected. For AArch64 (ARM64), function calls still use x30 for the return address as normal, though functions that clobber x30 can choose to spill and reload it using different memory. Non-leaf functions written in assembly should ideally make use of the shadow-call-stack ABI by spilling and reloading the return address register there instead of on the machine stack.

The main exception is code that is implementing something like a non-local exit or context switch. Such code may need to save or restore the shadow call stack pointer. Both the longjmp function and C++ throw already handle this directly, so C or C++ code using those constructs does not need to do anything new.

New code implementing some new kind of non-local exit or context switch will need to handle the shadow call stack pointer similarly to how it handles the traditional machine stack pointer register and the unsafe stack pointer. Any such code should use #if __has_feature(shadow_call_stack) to test at compile time whether shadow-call-stack is being used in the particular build. That preprocessor construct can be used in C, C++, or assembly (.S) source files.